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If the spending priorities of the debtor country and donor are the
same, these swaps can help debtor countries.  But sometimes
they do not make fiscal sense. And the future of these swaps may
be limited by the Brady Plan's current emphasis on debt reduc-
tion.
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Of the three  participants  in debt-for-nature  from buying  back  its debt  at the secondary
swaps,  intemational  environmental  groups  market  price  - let alone  at the higher  redemp-
benefit  the most.  These  swaps  leverage  the  tion rate usually  offered  in debt-for-nature
original  donation  amount  by the difference  swaps.
between  the secondary  market  value and  the
redemption  value  of the debt.  From a fiscal  standpoint,  the  debt-for-nature
swap, unlike  a straight  donation,  can worsen  the
As the  difference  between  the redemption  budget  situation  if spending  on the domestic
and  secondary  market  value  declines  over time,  environmental  bond exceeds  the debt-service
the environmental  group  benefits  less.  payments  on the external  debt  that is exchanged
in the swap.
Without  further  changes  in the tax and
regulatory  environment,  there  is little  reason-  When  resources  are limited,  spending  on
except  good  publicity  - for commercial  banks  debt-for-nature  swaps  reduces  the  resources
to donate  their  debt  to environmental  groups.  available  to other  (even  higher priority)  projects.
They can realize  more by selling their  debt on
the secondary  market.  The future of these  and similar  swaps  may
be limited  by the Brady  Plan's  current  emphasis
The  debtor country  subsidizes  the  swap by  on debt  reduction.  A debtor country  would
the difference  between  the  redemption  value  and  clearly  prefer to have its debt  partially  forgiven
secondary  market  of the debt.  There  is contro-  than  to swap it for a domestic  liability  created
versy  about  whether  the  debtor country  benefits  through  a debt-for-nature  swap.
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Debt-for-nature  swaps  involve  the  exchange  of  a  debtor
country's external obligation for that country's agreement to use
local currency instruments (usually  either cash or "environmental
bonds") to support a specific environmental project, such as the
designation and management of protected areas, the development of
conservation management plans,  training of park personnel,  and
environmental education activities.
Although the total amount of debt-for-nature swaps has been
limited--$79  million in face  value versus $1.3 billion of external
debt--the agreements have generated a lot of publicity because of
the  linkage  of  external  debt  reduction  with  environmental
protection  in  developing  countries.  While  debt-for-nature
agreements  will  never  substantially  reduce  developing-country
external debt, they can dramatically increase the amount of funds
spent by the debtor country on environmental protection.
Debt-for-nature agreements  are often described as deals where
everyone benefits: the debtor country reduces its external debt,
the  environmental  group  can  "leverage"  its  original  donation
amount, and banks profit either  from selling their debt on the
secondary market or from the publicity value of donating the debt
to  the  environmental  group.  This,  however,  is  clearly  too
simplistic an analysis of debt-for-nature agreements.  What  is
needed  is  a  more  thorough  understanding  of  the  economic  and
political effect that these agreements have on each participant.
After first reviewing the history and mechanics of debt-for-nature
1agreements, this paper  examines whether the debtor country and
environmental  group benefits  from  the  debt-for-nature  swap  compared
to  the  alternative  of  a  straight donation  of  funds  from  the
environmental group  to  the developing country, as well  as  the
incentives that commercial banks have to donate, rather than sell,
debt to international  environmental  groups.  Finally, what are the
future initiatives in debt-for-nature agreements?
History of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Soon  after  the  onset  of  the  debt  crisis  in  1982,
conservationists began to argue that the large amortization and
interest payments  made by the highly indebted  countries to service
their debt were causing irreparable  damage to their resource base.
According to conservationists, increasing exports to accumulate
foreign exchange for debt service put additional pressure on an
already  fragile  resource  base,  especially  since  many  these
countries were already dependent on primary commodity exports for
foreign exchange revenue.
Thomas Lovejoy, then vice president of science for the World
Wildlife Foundation, wrote an article for the New York Times in
1984  that  is  deemed  as  the  catalyst  for  the  debt-for-nature
concept.  Lovejoy  advocated  that conservation  groups  should use the
debt-equity  swap mechanism  to raise  local currency.  In  1987,
Conservation  International--a  international environmental  non-
profit organization  based in  the United States--and Bolivia signed
the first debt-for-nature agreement.  Since then, debt-for-nature
agreements  have  been  reached  in Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  and  the
2Philippines.
The Mechanics of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
In  a  typical  debt-for-nature  swap,  an  international
environmental non-profit  group uses donated  funds to purchase,
through a  financial intermediary, the debtor country's external
debt on the secondary market at a  steep discount from the face
value  of the  obligation  (referred to  as the  "secondary market
value").  (On  rare occasions, commercial  banks will donate the debt
instrument  to the environmental  group directly, thereby saving the
group the cost of purchasing the debt on the secondary market.)
The  international  environmental  group  and  the  debtor  country
usually then exchange  the debt instrument  at a  prearranged  discount
from the face value of the debt  (referred  to as the "redemption
value"), and the country issues  a  domestic currency instrument  that
will be used by the local environmental group to fund the agreed
upon environmental projects.  In addition, the debtor country and
the international  environmental  group will sometimes (for  example,
Bolivia) reach agreements that stipulate development restrictions
on protected areas in the debtor country.
The  secondary market  value  of  the  debt  purchased  by  the
environmental group is always at least equal to or less than the
redemption value offered by the debtor country, thereby allowing
the international environmental group to "leverage" its original
donation  and  supply  the  local groups  with  a  larger  amount  of
currency than would be available from a straight donation.  The
difference between secondary  market  value and the redemption  value
3can be considered the implicit subsidy amount paid by the debt ir
country to the environmental  group.  It reflects the amount of the
secondary market discount not captured by the country, assuming
that the secondary market price somewhat reflects the true price
of the debt.
Debt-for-Nature  Transactions
As shown in table 1, the total amount of debt  (face value)
converted  in eight  debt-for-nature swaps  has  reached  only  $79
million as of mid-1989.  This is significantly less than other
transactions in the secondary  market for  developing-country loans,
which  reached  a  level  of  $42  billion  in  1988  (Debt  and
International Finance Division Quarterly Review, March 1989).  Of
the  four countries who have  debt-for-nature programs  (Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Philippines), Costa Rica has been the most
active, retiring over $68 million (face  value) of debt.
Table 1. Debt-for-Nature Transactions.
--------------------------------------------------------------- _
Country  Date  Costi  Face  Local  Organization 4
Value  Currency 3
------------------------------------------------------------ __--
Bolivia  7/87  $100,000  $650,000  $250,000  CI
Ecuador  12/87  $354,000  $1,000,000  $1,000,000  WWF
Costa Rica  2/88  $891,000  $5,400,0005  $4,050,000  NPF
Costa Rica  6/88 $5,000,000 $33,000,000  $11,000,000  Netherlands
Costa Rica  6/88 $3,500,000 $24,500,000  $17,000,000  Sweden
Philippines 1/89  $200,000  $390,000  $390,000  WWF
Costa Rica  1/89  $784,000  $5,6P-,000  $1,680,000  TNC
Ecuador  4/89 $1,068,750  $9,000,000  $9,000,000  WWF/TNC
Notes:
1. $US expenditure by environmental g-oups or governments to
purchase the debt on the secondary market.
2. $US face  value of the  debtor country's  external  obligatione
purchased  by  the  environmental  groups  or  governments  on  the
secondary market.
43.  $US  equivalent of local  currency (either  in  "environmental"
bonds or currency) instruments issued by the debtor government in
exchange for its  external obligations.  For "environmental"  bonds,
this does not include the interest earned over the life of the
bonds.
4.  WWF  is  the  World  Wildlife  Fund;  TNC  is  the  Nature
Conservancy; NPF is the National Park Foundation of Costa Rica;
CI is Conservation E  sernational
5. Includes $S2%,000 in debt donated by Fleet National Bank
of Rhode Island.
6. According to Dutch officials, the 70 percent of the $33
million ($23  million) was a straight donation of debt to the Costa
Rican government,  while the remaining 30  percent ($10  million) was
converted into local currency bonds at full face value.
Source:  Nature Conservancy and assorted newspaper reports.
The  details of  each debr-for-nature swap can be  found  in
append.x 1.  Some of the more interesting  points of the agreements
are as follows:
*  The first  debt-for-nature agreement (Bolivia)  was the only
one  in which  land was  set aside,  and development  restrictions
adopted, as a result of the agreement.  This deal was extremely
controversial at first,  as many Bolivians thought that the country
had  relinquished sovereignty to the  international environmental
group.  There  is, however,  no  transfer  of  land ownership,  and
development  decisions are not  based on agreements  between  the local
environmental  groups, the government,  and the regional population.
The  Bolivian government has  been  slow  in dispersing  the  local
currency funds, and controversies  have arisen  over the development
use of the buffer areas.
*  Costa Rica  has  had the most  extensive debt-for-nature
proS .tm,  and was the first  country to involve  creditor governments
(Swedish  and the Dutch) in debt-for-nature  programs. [Note:  Sweden
and the Dutch government did not  use their own official debt in the
5transaction; they purchased commercial bank debt on the secondary
market.)  After seeing the secondary market price of their debt
fall  over  the  last  few years,  the  Costa  Rican  government  has
lowered their redemption rate from 70 to 30 percent of face  value,
thus reducing  the implicit  subsidy  amount  paid to the international
environmental groups.
*  In 4 ts  two  debt-for-nature agreements,  Ecuador  has redeemed
their  debt  at  full  face value,  granting  the  largest possible
subsidy.  Ecuador, however, has offset this large implicit subsidy
in  part by redeeming its  debt at an exchange rate  considerably less
than market rate, and issuing domestic "environmental" bonds that
have (ex  rost) interest rates lower than the inflation rate.
Who Benefits?
Debt-for-nature swaps  a2e often described  as deals  "where
everyone benefits."  This is not necessarily true.  This section
examines the costs and benefits of debt-for-nature swaps for the
three  major  participants:  commercial  banks,  international
environmental groups, and the debtor countries.
Commercial Banks
So far, commercial banks involvement  in  debt-for-nature swaps
have been mainly limited  to selling  sovereign  debt to international
conservation groups, or acting as their financial intermediaries.
Thus, the banks' role in debt-for-nature swaps have been similar
to their role in debt-for-equity  swaps; they are willing to supply
debt at the secondary market price to any buyer.
Banks have, however, reduced their commission on some of the
6debt-for-nature swaps.  Environmental  groups  have also been trying
to convince banks to donate their debt, thus saving them the cost
of purchasing the  debt on the secondary market.  Despite some
recent regulatory changes (such  as IRS ruling 87-124,  which allows
banks to deduct the full face value of the contribution, not just
its  market value), commercial banks still have little incentive  to
donate their debt.  Currently, only Fleet National Bank of Rhode
Island  has donated debt for  a  debt-for-nature swap ($250,000  in  the
first Costa Rican swap).  Even in this case, the bank decided to
write-down the debt, thereby receiving a tax deduction on the full
amount, rather than risk the financial  and regulatory implications
of a straight donation of debt.
Donating debt.  The key to any significant expansion of debt-for-
nature swaps lies in the financial and regulatory incentives for
banks to donate their debt.  In hope of giving banks incentive to
donate  their  debt,  the  IRS  issued  regulation  87-124  in  1988.
Before this regulation,  a bank donating debt to a non-profit group
could only take a tax deduction on the "fair" market value of the
donation.  Facing Congressional action on this issue, in 1988 the
IRS established regulation 87-124.  This regulation allows banks,
when donating debt, to recognize a loss equal to the difference
between the face  value of the debt and the fair  market  value of the
debt, and take a charitable deduction equal to -e  fair market
value of the debt.  Thus under this ruling, the banks can deduct
the full face value of the debt upon donation--not just its fair
market value.
7It was  hoped  tnat  this  regulation would  increase banks'
willingness to donate debt for debt-for-nature swaps.  But much of
the incentive to donate debt is reduced if the difference between
the face value of the debt and the fair market value of the debt
(the conversion discount) must be treated as a loss and charged
against the developing-country loan loss reserve for regulatory
purposes.  Currently,  debt used in  debt-for-equity swaps is  treated
in this manner, and the Securities and Exchange  '-mmission way
treat donated debt the same wa 4y.  Banks are particu  ly reluctant
to  record  a  loss  against  their  developing-country  loan-loss
reserveE  as evidenced by money-center banks'  unwillingness to
trade much of their own debt on the secondary market.
Further obfuscating an  already complex tax  and regulatory
environment  is a  recent  IRS  ruling  that  restricts  banks  from
deducting  foreign  loan  losses  from  their  domestic  income.
Previously, banks have deducted foreign loan losses from domestic
income, thereby protecting their  level of foreign loan income.
Now,  however,  foreign loan  losses must  be  apportioned  between
foreign and domestic income based on the bank's ratio of foreign
to total loans.  The level of foreign loan income is important
because the IRS  allows  banks to reduce  their U.S. taxes dollar-for-
dollar by the amount of foreign  tax credits (taxes  paid to foreign
governments).  A reducti-n.  in  the foreign  income  reduces  the amount
of  foreign tax  cred:-s.  available to  the  bank.  Although  this
clearly has an impact far  beyond the treatment of charitable debt,
this ruling could .imit bank's incentive to donate debt under 87-
8124.
Donate. write-down, or sell?  Banks essentially  have four options
in  handling  their  debt:  hold,  donate,  write-down,  or  sell.
Environmental  groups,  in  seeking  debt  for  donations,  are
essentially competing against the last two options.  All of these
options are subject to complex tax and regulatory implications.
Both donating the debt and writing off the debt allow the banks to
take a tax deduction for the full face value of the debt (that is,
the tax rate  t  face value of the debt).  But selling the debt at
the secondary market price, and getting a tax deduction for the
loss (on  the conversion  discount),  will always  yield the bank more,
as shown by the following equation.
p +  (l-p)t >  t  when  p,t  >  0
where:
p =  secondary market price of the debt, and
t  =  marginal tax rate.
Benefits  and costs to banks.  Environmental  groups argue that banks
receive two major benefits from debt-for-nature swaps; banks can
both dispose of their risky debt, and improve their relationships
with highly-indebted  developing countries. Swaps are also good for
the bank's reputation, especially with the increasing importance
of  environmental issues in developed countries.  Environmental
groups also argue that developing countries, by increasing their
future  economic  potential  through  sustainable  development  policies,
can also become better clients for the banks in the long run.
As  long as banks are selling--and r.ot  donating--debt they
9experience  the  same  costs  that  are  normally  present  in  any
secondary market transaction.  However, donating debt may result
in certain costs.  As shown earlier, it is more profitable, from
the  bank perspective,  to sell the debt on the secondary  market than
to donate the debt.  If the bank  is carrying the debt  at 100
percent of face value, donating the debt for tax purposes could
contaminate  the  bank's  portfolio,  forcing  it  to  increase  its
provisions against similar  type loans.  Finally, donating debt for
debt-for-nature swaps  may  put  additional pressure  on banks  to
forgive  other country  obligations,  and  would therefore be  unpopular
with the bank's shareholders.
Environmenta] Groups
International  environmental  groups clearly  benefit from debt-
for-nature swaps.  By receiving more in local currency from the
debt  swap  than  they  pay  for  the  debt  instrument,  they  can
"leverage" the original donation and supply local environmental
groups with additional funds.  Unless the debtor country redeems
the  debt  at  the  same  discount  that  the  environmental  group
purchased the instrument,  the swap will result in more money than
in a straight donation.  The debt-for-nature "concept" has also
increased the profile of environmental groups, as well as their
ability to raise funds for environmental  protection.
Finally, prior to the debt-for-nature concept, environmental
groups  had little  or no  direct contact  with either  ccmmercial banks
or  debt  countries'  finance ministers.  Debt-for-nature  swaps,
however,  have  entailed  intense negotiations between  all  three
10groups,  leading  to  a  network of  relationships  that  may  prove
valuable to international  environmental  groups beyond simply  debt-
for-nature agreements.
There  are  some  costs  in  participating  in debt-for-nature
agreements for international environmental groups.  One  of the
largest  costs to the environmental  groups is the amount of  time and
staff resources it takes to finalize a debt-for-nature agreement.
There  are  many  complex  steps  involved  in  an  agreement,  from
conceiving  of  the  idea,  meeting with  the  country,  organizing
donors, finding a  financial intermediary, purchasing  the debt,
finalizing  the swap arrangement,  and overseeing  the implementation.
Problems also  arise  in determining which,  and  how much,  local
environmental groups should receive of the local currency funds.
As in a straight donation of funds,  questions also arise regarding
the ultimate influence the donor (the  international environmental
group) has on the expenditure  of  the funds.  Finally, in the  United
States, the IRS holds the non-profit group responsible for the
expenditure of donated funds.
The  environmental groups  face a  decision: would  they  get
benefit more from a straight donation or a debt-for-nature swap.
At first glance, the answer may seem straightforward--a  debt-for-
-nature swap.  But, this may not necessarily be true.  The break
even point for the environmental groups is when the "leveraged"
amount received from the swap is  equal to the marginal cost of that
particular  debt-for-nature  agreement.  The  closer  the  debtor
country comes to capturing all of the discount on the secondary
11market  (such  as in Costa Rica), the lower is the leveraged amount
from the debt-for-nature swap, and the higher  probability that the
costs of arranging the swap  will outweigh  the benefits  of increased
local currency.
Second, some  countries exchange  the debt  at the  official
exchange rate, often for considerably less local currency units
than  the parallel market  exchange rate  (for example,  for each
dollar converted  the environmental  group could get 5  units of local
currency instead of 8 units). Thus, the implicit subsidy in the
debt-for-nature  swap  may  be  offset  by  the  difference  in  the
parallel and official exchanges rates.
Third,  in addition  to  the  local  currency  funds  that  the
environmental group  receives from  the  swap,  some  (for example
Bolivia) of the debt agreements have put development limitations
on  the  designated  protected  areas.  The  benefit  of  these
restrictions  to the international  environmental  group, and whether
these restrictions would have occurred outside of the debt-for-
nature framework,  is  difficult  to determine  and hard to incorporate
in a simple cost analysis.
Fourth, as cited earlier, a debt-for-nature agreement may be
more costly than a straight donation to the debtor country because
of the number of steps involved in finalizing the agreement.
Finally, the subsidy implicit in the debt-for-nature swap,
that is  the difference between  the redemption and secondary market
value of the debt, may be offset to a degree by the differential
between the interest yield on a domestic "environmenta] bond" and
12a comparable dollar dominated instrument that could be purchased
through donated funds.  In some of these countries (such as Costa
Rica and Ecuador), the environmental bonds issued as a result of
the debt-for-nature swap have yielded  nominal interest  rates lower
than the inflation rate.  [In Costa Rica, the bonds have yielded
interest rates of 15 percent with an inflation of 25 percent, and
in Ecuador interest on the bonds were 35 percent with inflation
rates of 86 percent,  despite the  bonds being "tied"  to market rates
(December  to December 1987-88).]
The bonds  are generally  nontransferable,  with a fixed interest
rate over at least a four year time horizon; high inflation and a
depreciating domestic  currency could make  a  dollar-denominated
instrument more attractive.  In addition, delays by the debtor
country  in releasing the  funds  (such as  in  the  Bolivia swap)
results in opportunity costs for the international environmental
group,  which  could  have  been  earning  interest  on  a  dollar-
denominated instrument in the interim period.
The Debtor Country
The costs and benefits of debt-for-nature swaps to the debtor
country are complex.  There is an extensive literature on whether
it makes sense for debtor countries  to participate in buybacks and
debt-for-equity swaps, and many of these insights directly apply
to debt-for-nature agreements.
Balance of payments.  First, it helps to contrast debt-for-nature
swaps with its more common relative--debt-for-equity  swaps (it is
common to hear debt-for-nature swaps referred to as the "son" of
13debt-for-equity swaps).  These two types of swaps have different
effects on the country's external accounts.  In a debt-for-equity
swap, the stock of external liabilities  is reduced by the discount
captured  by  the  debtor  country.  From  a  balance-of-payments
perspective, a debt-for-equity swap involves: (1)  a loan repayment
(outflow)  in the capital account equal to the redemption (market)
value of  the debt, and (2)  foreign  direct investment (inflow)  cqual
to the value of the newly created equity instrument.  From a long-
term  investment  income  flow  perspective,  a  reduction  of  the
country's  debt  service payments through the  retirement  of the
external obligation is offset  (to a  degree) by an  increase in
profit  remittances  from the  direct  foreign  investment.  [Note,
however,  that  debt-for-equity  swaps  tvpically  prohibit  profit
remittances during the first five or ten years.]
The effect of a debt-for-nature swap on the external account
is slightly different than in a debt-for-equity swap.  In a debt-
for-nature swap, the stock of external liabilities is reduced by
the whole face value of the debt, since their is no concomitant
creation of  an  equity  instrument.  From  a  balance-of-payments
perspective, a debt-for-nature swap involves (1)  a loan repayment
(outflow)  in the capital account equal to the redemption (market)
value of the debt, and (2)  an unrequited transfer (inflow,  current
account) equal to the value of the newly created instrument. From
a long-term  investment-income  flow  perspective,  there is  no outflow
of profit  remittances to offset  the reduction  in debt  service
payments as in a debt-for-equity agreement.
14Economic imRact  of swaps.  Debt-for-nature  consists essentially of
two steps: a buyback of debt, and an issuance of a local currency
instrument.  Much of the criticism of debt buybacks apply equally
to  debt-for-nature  agreements.  Bulow  and Rogoff (1988)  argue that,
from a debtor country perspective, buybacks are a mistake for two
reasons: tl)  when countries purchase  debt at the market  price, they
are paying "average"  debt prices  to retire "marginal"  debt; and (2)
that the collateral  used by sovereign  debtors (unlike  domestic  debt
where all collateral is seized upon default) can never be fully
seized  by tne creditor  government.  Therefore,  there is  less reason
for the debtor  country  (compared to the  domestic borrower) to
buyback debt, as the debtor country has less to lose in the case
of default.  Using this standard, debt-for-nature swaps are even
worse than straight buybacks, since the debtor country does not
even capture the full secondary market discount on its debt.
Other  economists argue  that the  subsidization inherent  in
debt-for-equity  swaps  makes  sense  only  as  long  as  the  direct
foreign  investment would  not  otherwise have  occurred.  It  is
possible  that this  logic  could be  extended  to debt-for-nature
swaps; that is, that the subsidization inherent in  debt-for-nature
swaps would make sense only if tne donation would not otherwise
have occurred.
Donation versus swaR.  Is a country better of receiving a straight
donation or participating in a debt-for-nature swap?  If we assume
that the donation would  occur even without the debt-for-nature
program  (probably a generous assumption), the debtor country is
15clearly better off receiving a straight donation.
In a straight donation of funds, the debtor country has only
a limited role in the transaction (and only when the country has
a  fixed exchanged rate).  Looking at the external balance, the
country receives an inflow of foreign exchange.  The effect of a
donation on the Central Bank account balance is shown in table 2.
In a floating exchange regime, the conversion of foreign exchange
into domestic currency occurs in the financial markets, and the
exchange rate adjusts.  There is no effect on the Central Bank
account balance.
Table 2.  Central Bank Accounts
Straight Donation  Debt-for-Nature
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities
(1)  F. Exchange +  (1)  Currency +  (3) Currency  +
(2) Currency  - (3) External  Debt  -
(2) Bonds  +  (4) External  Debt  -
(4) Bonds  +
Many of these countries, however, have a fixed exchange rate
regime. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the Central Bank would
experience an increase in its foreign exchange assets and domestic
currency liabilities (transaction  1).  The bank may or  may not want
to sterilize the monetary impact of the exchange.  If the Central
Bank does not sterilize, the increase in domestic currency in a
donation  will  be  usually  be  less  than  the  increase  in  local
currency in a debt-for-nature swap, because there is no implicit
subsidization by the debtor country in  the straight donation case.
[Note, however,  that  in most  debt-for-nature swaps  the  debtor
country issues  environmental bonds and not an equivalent amount of
16local currency.]
If the Central Bank does decide to sterilize the monetary
effect of the foreign exchange inflow (transaction  2), and issues
bonds at competitive market rates, the country could face higher
expenditures than in issuing environmental bonds from a debt-for-
nature  swap.  In many cases  (Costa Rica,  Ecuador) the  nominal
interest rate on the nontransferable "environmental" bonds have
been  lower than  the rate of  inflation, resulting  (ex post)  in
negative real interest rates.
In a debt-for-nature-swap, however, the country receives no
foreign exchange inflow.  Instead, it is given the opportunity to
retire part of its external debt, on which it may or may not be
making current  payments.  If the country is  making any payments on
the  debt, it is likely  to be only interest--not  principal--payments
since the debt is trading at less than face value on the secondary
market.
As table 2 shows, in a debt-for-nature swap the Central Bank
either exchanges the external debt  (after marking  it to market
value) for domestic currency (transaction  3), or issues  a domestic
bond at the agreed upon terms (transaction  4).  Transactions 3 and
4--unlike transaction 1--involve an exchange of one external type
of liability for a domestic liability.  But in many of the highly
indebted countries, it is the internal balance that is the most
binding; the debt-for-nature swap, unlike a straight donation, can
clearly worsen  the fiscal situation if the expenditures on the
domestic bonds exceed the payments on the external debt that is
17exchanged in the swap.
Benefits to the debtor country.  Debt-for-nature swaps are said to
benefit the debtor country because it reduces their external debt.
As  has  been  argued  by  numerous  economists,  reducing the  debt
overhang  may result in  efficiency gains for  the country. According
to this argument, because of the "overhang" of debt, investments
that are often efficient from an economic perspective--that is, in
which the marginal product of capital is greater than the cost
(interest  rate)  of  external  borrowing  (LIBOR  plus  some  risk
premium)--are  not  undertaken because  the  return from  the investment
will be extracted by the creditor for debt service payments.  In
this situation, reducing the level of debt is beneficial to the
cotunitry.  In  addition, unlike  a  debt-for-equity  swap, the debt-for-
nature expenditures benefit the debtor country's residents.
Costs to the debtor country.  The implicit subsidization of the
debt-for-nature  swaps,  the inflationary  impact,  and  the sovereignty
issue are often described as costs to debtor countries.  Debtor
countries have  scarce  resources, and expenditures on debt-for-
nature swaps  may reduce  the amount  of resources available for  other
expenditures.  To the  extent that debt-for-nature expenditures
simply  replace  normal  budget  expenditures  for  environmental
protection,  there  is  no  implicit  tradeoff  or  cost  to  the
government.  However, this is not normally the case, as debt-for-
nature  swaps  increase government  expenditures on  environmental
protection over previous levels,  potentially  reducing expenditures
for other--as equally important--programs.
18Debt-for-nature  swaps appear  to  have  minimal  inflationary
impact.  Most  of  the  debt-for-nature  swaps  have  involved  the
issuance of environmental  bonds and not a lump-sum  disbursement of
local currency.  As shown in table 2, issuing of environmental
bonds (transaction  4)  has no immediate  effect on  domestic currency;
it involves the exchange of an external debt instrument for an
internal debt instrument.  If the expenditures on the debt-for-
nature swap simply replaces normal budgetary expenditures on the
environment, it is not inflationary.  [That is, if the debt-for-
nature domestic bond was simply a replacement for a domestic bond
that would have been issued anyway to cover similar environmental
expenditures;  otherwise,  the issuance  of a  new bond  will eventually
lead to additional expenditures.]  In addition, the bonds are not
inflationary to the extent that their payments are less than or
equal  to  the  equivalent  payments  made  on  the  external  debt
instrument.
Perhaps  the most controversial  aspect  of  debt-for-nature  swaps
is  the possibility  that the swaps may result in the debtor country
relinquishing  aspects of  its  sovereignty  to  the  international
environmental group.  But there has never been a single debt-for-
nature swap that resulted in a transfer of land ownership from a
debtor country to an international  environmental group.  In fact,
only in the Bolivia swap was additional land (the "buffer" areas)
set aside and development restrictions adopted to protect these
areas.  The rest of the swaps have resulted only in local currency
instruments designed to fund local environmental groups, and not
19in  creating  newly  protected  areas  with  specific  development
limitations.
New Initiatives in Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Official Debt
So far, debt-for-nature swaps have involved only commercial
bank debt traded on the secondary market.  Unable to get banks to
donate debt  for debt-for-nature swaps, environmental groups are
trying to increase the available pool of debt for debt-for-nature
swaps by convincing official creditors to allow their debt to be
used in  debt-for-nature  swaps.  Such environmental  groups  as Nature
Conservancy and World Wildlife Fund have been lobLying the U.S.
government  (both Cor.gress  and  the  Executive  Branch) to  donate
official debt for debt-for-nature or debt-for-development swaps.
In the United States, one of the major obstacles in getting the
government to donate its debt to the environmental groups is the
budgetary impact of the donation.  It is still not clear how the
donation (or  forgiveness)  would be scored against the budget; that
is, whether a loss of revenue for the government would occur, and
if so, how large.
Much  of the  interest in using  official debt for debt-for-
development swaps  first began as a  result of the  1988 Toronto
Economic Summit, in  which the G-7 countries established  guidelines
that allowed Paris Club Creditors to forgive debt to the poorest
of the Sub-Saharan countries.  One of three options given to Paris
Club creditors was to forgive  up to one-third of the debt of the
developing country (with the other two being extended maturities
20and lower interest rates).  France has generally chosen the first
option,  while  the  United  States  (until July  1989)  has  been
reluctant to forgive debt.
Creditor governments' willingness to forgive debt for low-
income African countries may open the door to donating debt to
environmental groups for debt-for-nature swaps.  However, debtor
countries are clearly better off having their debt forgiven by
creditor governments  than buying back their debt through debt-for-
nature agreements.  Thus, there would be little  incentive for
debtor countries to participate in  debt-for-nature a.-ee-ents that
used official debt if a large amount of their offi-al  debt was
being forgiven through other channels.
Instead  of  donating  official  debt  to  the  international
environmental  group for  debt-for-nature  swaps,  creditor  governments
could themselves explicitly link debt forgiveness to a range of
policy  reforms--such  as  environmental  protection--in  debtor
countries.  If the debtor country compares such an arrangement to
a debt-for-nature swap done through an international  environmental
group,  the  benefits  of  not  having  to  issue  a  local  currency
instrument  (necessary in a  debt-for-nature swap) would  have to
weighed against the costs of agreeing to the creditor country's
conditionality.
However,  debtor  countries  (especially  Brazil)  have  been
sensitive  to  international  criticism  of  their  environmental
policies in  the past, and such  a direct linkage  of debt forgiveness
to environmental policy  reforms by creditor countries would  be
21extremely controversial.  Brazil and other countries are already
wary of the  sovereignty  implications  of  debt-for-nature  agreements;
a plan  linking debt  forgiveness to environmental policy  reforms
could be viewed as an even greater threat to national sovereignty,
and  invoke  charges  of  neo-colonialist  behavior  by  creditor
countries.  However, there is seemingly little chance that any of
Brazil's official debt will be forgiven.
World Bank and Debt-for-Nature Swags
There have been  a variety of proposals by  international
environmental groups, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. Treasury to
increase World Bank involvement in debt-for-nature swaps.
Using  multilateral  debt  for  debt-for-nature  swaps.  As  with
official  debt,  international  environmental  groups  have  been
interested in using multilateral debt for debt-for-nature swaps.
World Bank debt has never been rescheduled or sold in secondary
markets, and Bank officials have repeatedly stated that they are
prohibited by charter to use Bank debt for debt-for-nature swaps.
But Congressman  John Porter, in  testimony before the International
Development  Institutions  Subcommittee  of  the  House  Banking
Committee on  May  24, 1989, argued that the World  Bank has some
flexibility in refinancing or restructuring debt under Article I,
Section 4(C) of the bank's Articles of Agreement  (Cody, 1988).
According to Porter, the World Bank's choice not to reschedule or
refinance can be considered more of a policy decision designed to
protect the bank's AAA bond rating.
World Bank as a clearing-house for debt-for-nature swaps.  In
22April 1988, the U.S. Treasury submitted a report to Congress on
possible  initiatives that  could  be  undertaken  by  multilateral
development  banks--specifically  the  World Bank--to  encourage debt-
for-nature swaps (U.S. Department of Treasury, 1988).  The report
recommended a host of measures that the World Bank could adopt to
facilitate debt-for-nature agreements.  They are as follows:
*  Debt-for-nature swaps could be "piggybacked"  on World Bank
and other multilateral development  banks' environmental loans.
*  The World Bank serves as a  clearinghouse for debt-for-
nature swaps,  identifying  banks interested  in  donating (or  selling)
debt, and acting as a source of infornation  for both environmental
groups and debtor countries interested in debt-for-nature swaps.
*  Establishing  a World Bank pilot program for countries that
have, or are interested  in implementing,  a  debt-for-nature  program.
The World Bank could offer technical assistance in the design of
the debt-for-nature program.
Enforceability of debt-for-nature aareements.  Finally, there has
been some discussion in the U.S. Congress about using the World
Bank as a means to ensure  that debtor countries actually implement
the  agreed  upon  covenants  arising  from  the  debt-for-nature
agreement  (House of Representatives Report  100-994, 1988).  In
general-obligation  finance,  the  cross-default  clause  assures
lenders the same sanction rights in case of a default.  In debt-
for-equity and debt-for-nature swaps, the owner of the obligation
would have to rely on the domestic legal system of the borrower
country to enforce its claim.  To increase  the costs (and  thus the
23likelihood  of compliance) for debtor countries  that fail to comply
with  the  terms  of  their  debt-for-nature  agreement,  some
international  environmental  groups would like to make disbursement
of  new  World  Bank  environmental  loans  conditional  on  debtor
country's compliance with debt-for-nature covenants.
Conclusion
Of  the  three  participants  in  debt-for-nature  swaps,  the
international  environmental  group benefits the most from the swap,
as it leverages its original donation amount by the difference
between the secondary market  value and the redemption value of the
debt.  As the  difference between the  redemption and  secondary
market value declines over time, the costs of the debt-for-nature
swap for the environmental group  (such as the complexity of the
deals, the low real returns on the domestic instrument, and the
differences between official and parallel exchange rates) is more
likely to offset the "leveraged"  amount gained through the debt-
for-nature mechanism.
Unless  there  is further change to  the tax  and  regulatory
environment,  there is  little  reason--other  than  positive  publicity-
-for commercial banks to donate their debt to the international
environmental group.  Under the current system, commercial banks
can always realize more by selling their debt on the secondary
market.
The  debtor  country  subsidizes the  swap by  the  difference
between the redemption value and secondary market value of the
debt.  In the economic literature, there  is still considerable
24controversy over whether the debtor country benefits from buying
back  its debt  at the secondary market price--let  alone  at the
higher redemption rate usually offered in debt-for-nature swaps.
From  a  fiscal  standpoint,  the  debt-for-nature  swap,  unlike  a
straight donation, can clearl- worsen the budgetary situation if
the expenditures on the domestic environmental bond exceeds the
debt-service  payments on the external  debt that is exchanged in  the
swap.
Highly indebted  countries  must make difficult fiscal  choices,
usually facing strict constraints  of IMF and World Bank fiscal  and
monetary targets.  In a situation of limited financial resources,
expenditures  on  debt-for-nature  swaps  reduces  the  resources
available to other projects.  To the extent that the swap is seen
as a costless transaction, and not explicitly accounted for in a
country's budget, expenditures  on debt-for-nature swaps may reduce
resources for even higher priority projects.
Although debt-for-nature (and development) swaps will never
significantly reduce the external debt of developing countries,
they can sharply increase  the funds available  to specific projects
in  the  debtor  country.  If  the  debtor  countries  and  donors'
expenditure  priorities are the same, these swaps can be beneficial
to the debtor country.
Finally, the future of debt-for-natura and similar swaps may
be limited  by the Brady Plan's current  emphasis on debt reduction.
Debt reduction by commercial banks, forgiveness of official debt
by  creditor  countries,  and  the  clear  prohibition  of  using
25multilateral  debt  for  debt-for-nature  swaps  reduces  both  the
available  supply  of  debt  and  much  of  incentives  for  debtor
countries to  participate  in  debt-for-nature  arrangements. A debtor
country  would clearly prefer  to  have its  debt forgiven  than to swap




26In July  1987, Conservation International, using a $100,000
grant  from  the  Frank Weeden  foundation, purchased  $650,000  of
Bolivia's commercial bank debt at roughly 15 cents on the dollar
(a  discount  of  85  percent).  In  exchange  for  Conservation
International's cancellation of the debt, Bolivia agreed to set
aside 3.7  million acres in  three conservation  areas surrounding  the
Beni Biosphere in the Amazon basin.  In addition, Bolivia agreed
to contribute $100,000  in  pesos to a $250,000  peso fund  established
to manage the Beni Reserve area, with the remaining $150,000  being
contributed  by the  U.S. Agency for  International  Development (AID).
The $250,000 fund is to be administered through the Ministry of
Agriculture  and  a  local environmental group  to be  selected by
Conservation International.
The Beni Biosphere area consists of forests and grasslands
that  stpport over  13 endangered plant and  animal  species, 500
species of birds, and is  home to the nomadic Chimane Indians.  The
agreement calls for the newly designated areas, all owned by the
government,  to  serve  as a  buffer  zone to  the  Biosphere  area,
allowing  sustainable  development  (such as  limited  logging and
farming) in the buffer areas.  The 3.7 million acres includes the
2.9 million Chimane forest  reserve, as well as the Yacuma Regional
Park and the Corbedeni Hydrological basin  (800,000 acres).  The
$250,000 peso environmental fund will be used to support various
programs in the Biosphere and buffer areas.  The National Academy
of Sciences,  a Bolivian  NGO, is  helping to  develop the conservation
plans for  the buffer areas. The Academy also oversees a commission
27of local officials and 10 non-governmental institutions, such as
the Institute of Ecology and the Environmental League  (LIDEMA),
that are involved in the development of the areas.
There  have,  however,  been  delays  and  problems  in  the
implementation of the agreement.  The Bolivian government only as
recently as April 1989 made its $100,000 peso contribution to the
environmental fund, while a dispute has developed over the use of
the "permanent production forest"  in the Chimane forest reserve.
This area is home to a number of indigenous population groups, one
of  which  includes  the  Chimane  Indians.  When  the  logging
concessions  were granted by the Bolivian  government earlier in the
year,  the  Chimane  Indians  (far less  organized  than  the  other
indigenous  groups)  were  not  represented.  After  a  series  of
protests by the Chimane Indians,  the Bolivian  government suspended
the logging concessions pending a governmental review that is to
be completed in the next few months.
The amount of the implicit subsidy in the Bolivian swap is
not simply the difference between the redemption value  ancd  the
secondary  market  value, for  the economic  value of the "development"
rights  to  the  $3.7  million  acre  butfer  area  is difficult  to
estimate.  An analysis of the net present value of the various
possible development  alternatives for the $3.7  billion acres under
the debt-for-nature  agreement  is outside  the scope of this project.
Looking simply at the amount paid by Conservation International
($100,000  for $650,000  of Debt) and the amount  paid by the Bolivian
government  ($100,000 for  $650,000)  for  the  debt,  there  is  no
28subsidy, as the Bolivian government captures the full secondary
market discount.
Costa Rica
Costa Rica's debt-for-nature program is the largest of the
current programs.  According to Dr. Alvaro Umana Queseda, Costa
Rica's Minister of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, Costa Rica
has swapped over $75 million (face  value) of debt for $36 million
in local currency bonds--a discount of roughly 48 percent.  The
$75 million figure includes, however, a $10 million debt-equity
swap  involving  a  local  door-manufacturing  industry,  which  is
generally considered as a private debt-for-equity swap.  This is
included in the $75 million figure  because harvesting restrictions
were  placed  on  the  5,000  hectares of  forest purchased  by  the
manufacturing company from the proceeds of the swap.  In addition,
Dr. Quesada reports that the Netherlands and Costa Rica agreed to
a  $33  million  (face  value)  debt-for-nature  swap.  However,
according to Nature Conservancy  and Dutch officials, 70 percent of
the $33 million was actually a straight donation of debt to the
Costa Rica Central Bank, leaving only $10 million (30  percent) in
face value actually converted  under a debt-for-nature swap.  These
classification  differences could result in a more conservative $45
million figure for Costa Rica's debt-for-nature program.
The Original $5.4 Million Conversion.
In 1987,  the Costa  Rica's  Central Bank,  at  Dr. Queseda's
suggestion, established a debt-fcr-nature program with an initial
ceiling of $5.4 million.  This $5.4 million figure was surpassed
29by early 1988.  Funds to purchase the debt came from a variety of
sources  (World  Wildlife  Foundation,  Nature  Conservancy,  and
others), and $891,000 of donated funds were used by the National
Park Foundation of Costa Rica to purchase $5.15 million of debt--
at  17 cents  on the dollar  (a discount of 83.5 percent).  The
remaining $250,000 of debt was donated by Fleet National Bank of
Rhode Island.
The Costa Rica government exchanged its debt at 75 percent of
face value, offering  $4.05 million  in local currency  (colones)
"environmental  bonds," that have a 6 year maturity and an average
interest rate of 25 percent.  The bonds are nontransferable,  offer
no  principal in the first year, and can be used as collateral for
additioiial  loans.  The implicit  subsidy  amounts  to $3.1  million for
the Costa Rican government.  Proceeds of the bonds are to be used
for  the  management  of  Costa  Rica's  park  system.  Seeing  the
secondary market price of its commercial bank debt drop from 30
cents to the low teens, Costa Rica changed its exchange guarantee
from 75 percent to 30 percent of face value after the initial $5.4
million program.  By reducing its redemption value, Costa Rica
captures more of the discount on the secondary market, and limits
the implicit subsidy of the swap.
The $33 Million Netherlands Debt-for-Nature Swap.
According to Dr Queseda, in June 1988 the Dutch Government
committed 10 million guilders ($5  million) to purchase Costa Rican
commercial  bank  on  the  secondary  market  through  a  designated
financial intermediary.  The Dutch government  purchased almost $33
30million  (face value) of debt, at a secondary market price of 15
cents on the dollar  (a  discount of 85 percent).  The rest of the
terms of the agreement are unclear.  According to Dr. Queseda,
Costa Rica converted the $33 million at 33 percent of face value
(67  percent  discount),  issuing  $11  million  worth  of  colone
environmental  bonds with an interest  rate of 15 percent and 4 year
maturity.  According to Nature Conservancy  and Dutch officials, 70
percent of the $33 million was donated to Costa Rican government
(23 million), while  the  remaining 30 percent  (10 million) was
converted into local currency  bonds at full face  value ($10  million
of colone bonds). The bonds are to fund reforestation and support
local cooperative institutions concerned about the environment.
Although the differences in the terms of the agreement result in
roughly the same amount of local currency bonds, they result in a
different swap figure--$33  million  versus $23  million--and implicit
subsidy level--of 18 percent versus 85 percent.
The $24.5 Million Swedish Debt-for-Nature Swap.
Around the same time as the Netherlands agreement, Swedish
private conservation groups and student groups, lead by Daniel
Janzen, raised  over $15  million to  support  environmental  protection
of Costa Rica's Guanacaste National Park.  $3.5 million of that
total was used to purchase $24.5 million  (face value)  of Costa
Rican debt at a price of 14 cents on the dollar (a  discount of 86
percent).  Costa Rica has agreed  to exchange the debt at 70 percent
of face value (30  percent discount), issuing $17 million worth of
colone  environmental bonds  at  15 percent  interest and  4  year
31maturity.  Since it was Sweden's first bilateral aid contribution,
and the project  was developed  during the terms of the original $5.4
million swap facility, Costa Rica offered to exchange the debt at
70 percent of face value,  instead of the new official exchange
guarantee of 30 percent of face value.  Exchanging the debt at 70
percent face  value, instead  of 30  percent of face value, increases
the implicit subsidy  by roughly  $10 million ($14  million versus $4
million).
The $5.7 Million Nature Conservancy Debt-for-Nature Swap.
In early  1989, the  Nature  Conservancy, using  $784,000  in
donated funds and American Express as its financial intermediary,
purchased $5.6 million of Costa Rica debt at a secondary market
price of 14 cents on the dollar (a  discount of 84 percent).  Costa
Rica exchanged the debt at 30 percent of face -alue (70 percent
discount), issuing  $1.7  million of Costa  Rican currency  bonds.  The
bonds will yield an average interest rate of 25 percent over 5
years.
Ecuador
Ecuador has had two debt-for-nature agreements.  In the first
December  1987  agreement,  the World  Wildlife  Foundation,  using
354,000 in donated funds, purchased $1 million  (face value) of
Ecuador's commercial bank debt at a price of 35 cents on the dollar
(a discount of 65 percent).  Ecuador exchanged the debt at face
value,  issuing $1 million of Ecuadorian currency bonds  at the
official  exchange  rate.  (The  official  exchange  rate  ir
considerably less than the floating rate.)  The bonds have a nine
32year maturity, and are linked to market interest rates.  Proceeds
from  the bonds are to be used for  park infrastructure  improvements,
environmental  management  plans,  park  personnel  training,  and
educational activities.
Ecuador's second debt-for-nature swap was completed in April
1989.  In this swap, the Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife
Foundation,  and the Missouri Botanical  Gardens used $1.068  million
in donated funds to purchase $9 million (face  value) of Ecuador's
debt  at a  cost of  roughly 12 cents  on the dollar  (88 percent
discount).  Ecuador  redeemed the debt at 100  percent of face  value,
with the proceeds from the $9  million  worth of local currency  bonds
going to Fundacion Natura, Ecuador's leading conservation group.
Fundacion Natura will use the money to protect Amazonian national
parks and reserves.
Philippines
In an agreement  reached in June  1988, the  World  Wildlife
Foundation purchased $390,000 (face  value) of Philippine debt at
a price of 55 cents on the dollar (a 45 percent discount), using
$200,000 in donated funds.  The Philippine government redeemed the
debt at 100 percent of face value, creating an account containing
$390,000 worth of local currency.  The account will be managed by
the Haribon Foundation.  Proceeds from the funds will be used for
the protection of two parks on Palawan Island, and the development
of management plans and infrastructure for other national parks.
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